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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3005 
___________ 
 
RONALD RILEY,           
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY DAUPHIN COUNTY 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-01371) 
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 21, 2016 
Before:  CHAGARES, KRAUSE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 20, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
PER CURIAM 
 Ronald Riley appeals pro se from the District Court’s dismissal of his civil rights 
action.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.  
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I. 
 Riley is a state prisoner who brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the 
District Attorney of Dauphin County, Edward M. Marsico.  Riley, convicted of rape in 
1985, alleged that Marsico violated Riley’s constitutional rights when he prosecuted 
Riley in 2006 for violations of provisions of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law, 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. §§ 9791-9799.41, which was enacted in 1995.  Riley alleged that the relevant 
registration provisions of Megan’s Law did not apply to him, and that Marsico misled the 
state court to secure Riley’s guilty plea and conviction. 
 A magistrate judge recommended that the District Court dismiss the complaint 
with prejudice for the failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.  Riley filed 
objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation.  The District Court then 
adopted the report and recommendation and dismissed the case with prejudice.  This 
appeal followed. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In considering a dismissal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, we apply the same de novo standard of review as with 
our review of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  
See, e.g., Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Because Riley 
proceeded pro se in the District Court, we construe his pleadings liberally.  See Haines v. 
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).  We may affirm on any ground that the record 
supports.  See Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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III. 
The District Court did not err when it concluded that Riley’s complaint failed to 
state a claim.  First, Riley’s complaint set out what is best construed as a malicious 
prosecution claim.  A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim may not challenge a 
purportedly illegal conviction unless the underlying conviction has first been reversed on 
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized 
to make such a determination, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas 
corpus.  See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).  Heck bars Riley’s 
argument that Marsico wrongfully obtained an illegitimate criminal conviction against 
him because the conviction has not been invalidated.  Moreover, the District Court was 
also correct to note that Marsico is absolutely immune from civil suit for damages under 
§ 1983.  See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423-28 (1976) (holding that prosecutors 
have immunity from suit for actions within the scope of their prosecutorial duties).  
Riley’s malicious prosecution claim therefore fails. 
Second, Riley’s complaint sets out what is best construed as a Fourteenth 
Amendment due process claim.  Riley’s argument is that the relevant registration 
provisions of Megan’s Law did not apply to him.  On appeal, Riley has clarified that his 
argument is that he was not afforded adequate due process for the determination that 
Megan’s Law applied and that he was required to register.  Riley raised that claim before 
in another lawsuit against different parties, and this Court rejected it as meritless.  See 
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C.A. No. 15-1649, Per Curiam Opinion issued July 29, 2015.  Riley’s due process claim 
therefore fails as well. 
 Finally, these legal deficiencies with Riley’s claims go to the heart of the action 
and could not have been cured through amendment to Riley’s complaint.  Consequently, 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Riley’s complaint with 
prejudice without first providing leave to amend.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 
293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
